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A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION: THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT REQUIRES REASONABLE 
SUSPICION FOR FORENSIC 
EXAMINATIONS OF ELECTRONIC 
STORAGE DEVICES DURING BORDER 
SEARCHES IN UNITED STATES v. 
COTTERMAN 
Abstract: On March 8, 2013, in United States v. Cotterman, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit—sitting en banc—held that U.S. border agents 
must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before conducting a fo-
rensic search of an electronic storage device at the border. In reaching this 
conclusion, the court narrowed existing federal appeals court precedents, 
which held that manual searches of electronic storage devices do not require 
any suspicion. This Comment argues that a reasonable suspicion requirement 
is illogical, harmful to national security, and administratively impractical. In-
stead, strengthening existing federal regulations is a better method to protect 
personal privacy interests. 
INTRODUCTION 
Approximately sixty-two million personal vehicles crossed the U.S.-
Mexican border in 2012.1 Border agents are tasked with the duty of prevent-
ing these vehicles from transporting contraband into the United States.2 In 
order to accomplish this obligation, the border search doctrine grants border 
agents wide discretion to conduct inspections at the border—even those that 
might otherwise be prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.3 In 2013, in Unit-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Border Crossing/Entry Data: Query Detailed Statistics, RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. 
ADMIN. BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., http://transborder.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/
TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCQ.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014) (select “Southern Border Ports” for 
“Port Location”; select “2012” for “Year”; select “Annual Summary” for “Month”; select “Aggre-
gate All Southern Border Ports” for “Port Name”; select “All Measures Detail” for “Measure”; 
click “Submit”), archived at http://perma.cc/KH8M-7MLC?type=pdf. 
 2 United States v. Cotterman (Cotterman III), 709 F.3d 952, 971 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) 
(Callahan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), cert. denied, 82 U.S.L.W. 3095 
(U.S. Jan. 13, 2014) (No. 13-186). 
 3 Id.; Ickes v. United States, 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2005); see United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563–64 (1976) (indicating that border agents have “wide discretion” when 
determining which vehicles to search at the border). 
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ed States v. Cotterman (Cotterman III), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit limited this discretion by requiring agents to possess a reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity before conducting a forensic examination 
of an electronic storage device during a border search.4 The court reasoned 
that electronic storage devices are unlike traditional storage devices, such as 
suitcases or car trunks, and therefore warrant heightened Fourth Amend-
ment protection.5 
Part I of this Comment discusses the Fourth Amendment, the border 
search doctrine, and the recent federal directives regarding searches of elec-
tronically stored information.6 Then, it addresses the Cotterman III court’s 
holding that the district court erred in granting Cotterman’s motion to sup-
press evidence gathered from his laptop.7 Part II examines the alternative 
approaches to border searches of electronic storage devices utilized by other 
federal appeals courts and, further, how Cotterman III narrowed existing 
circuit precedent by requiring reasonable suspicion for forensic examina-
tions.8 Lastly, Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision was both il-
logical and administratively impractical, and served to protect personal pri-
vacy rights at the expense of national security.9 Part III concludes that exec-
utive directives governing the scope of forensic examinations of electronic 
storage devices are a practical alternative that can strike a more appropriate 
balance between personal privacy and national security.10 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS DURING A CROSSING 
OF THE U.S. BORDER 
A. The Border Search Doctrine 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”11 For a search to be 
reasonable, state actors must obtain a warrant based on probable cause.12 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 968. The court described the forensic examinations of elec-
tronic storage devices as a “powerful tool capable of unlocking password-protected files, restoring 
deleted material, and retrieving images viewed on websites.” Id. at 957. 
 5 Id. at 964–66, 968. 
 6 See infra notes 11–25 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 26–41 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 42–72 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 73–97 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 98–113 and accompanying text. 
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 12 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1975) (stating that probable cause is a “mini-
mum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution”); Camara v. Mun. Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (noting that probable cause is the standard used to determine if a search 
is constitutionally reasonable). 
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Probable cause is defined as “[a] reasonable ground to suspect that a person 
has committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains specific 
items connected with a crime.”13 
For border searches, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated 
that no suspicion is required for a search to be constitutionally reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.14 A border search is a search conducted at a 
U.S. border to detect illegal aliens or contraband.15 Therefore, it follows 
that border searches are an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s require-
ment of a warrant based on probable cause.16 
Despite this exception, some border searches may require a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.17 The Court has defined a reasonable suspi-
cion as “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 
person” of transporting contraband.18 In 2004, in United States v. Flores-
Montano, the U.S. Supreme Court provided three categories of border 
searches that may require reasonable suspicion: “(1) highly intrusive 
searches of the person; (2) destructive searches of property; and (3) search-
es conducted in a particularly offensive manner.”19 Today, for border 
                                                                                                                           
 13 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1321 (9th ed. 2009). 
 14 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (noting that “searches made at the bor-
der . . . are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border”). 
 15 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1468. 
 16 See Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding that merely crossing 
the border is a sufficient reason to search a person); see also Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317, 
324 (5th Cir. 1965) (“A true border search . . . is not regarded as unreasonable even though made 
without probable cause.”); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir. 1960) (“The right of 
border search does not depend on probable cause.”). This border search exception was first estab-
lished by a customs statute passed by Congress in 1789. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 23–24, 
1 Stat. 29, 43; see also Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616 (stating that the border search exception existed 
before the Fourth Amendment was proposed). See generally Jules D. Barnett, A Report on Search 
and Seizure at the Border (Customs Problems), 1 AM. CRIM. L. Q., Aug. 1963, at 36 (discussing 
the Act of July 31, 1789 and subsequent border search legislation). In 1977, in United States v. 
Ramsey, the U.S. Supreme Court officially recognized the exception. 431 U.S. at 619 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (reaffirming the “longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without 
probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless reasonable”). Today, customs agents continue 
to enjoy the ability to conduct searches at the border without probable cause or a warrant. See 19 
U.S.C. § 482(a) (2006) (allowing agents to search “any vehicle, beast, or person” for merchandise 
which “may have been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law”). 
 17 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152, 155–56 & n.2 (2004). 
 18 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985); see also United States 
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981). 
 19 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152–56 & n.2; see Cotterman III 709 F.3d at 973 (Callahan, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152–56 & n.2). Under this framework, the Court held that the removal, 
disassembly, and reassembly of a vehicle’s gas tank was not so destructive as to require U.S. border 
agents to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155–56. A 
search of a traveler’s alimentary canal, however, is one example of a “highly intrusive search of a 
person.” See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541. The Court has never held a search to be 
“particularly offensive.” Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 982 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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searches of property, it appears that lower courts should determine if either 
of the latter two above categories is applicable.20 
In August 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued 
new directives to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to protect personal privacy interests 
by restricting how information gathered from confiscated electronic devices 
can be used.21 Described as “guidelines,” the directives create substantial 
limitations on the retention, sharing, and destruction of confiscated data.22 
For example, the CBP directive requires all searches of electronic devices to 
be completed as “expeditiously as possible.”23 Furthermore, according to 
this directive, all detentions of devices should not last longer than five days, 
and managers must approve any detention that exceeds five days.24 Addi-
tionally, if a CBP agent determines that there is no probable cause for re-
taining copied information, the information must be destroyed within seven 
days.25 
B. Venturing Across the Border with 453 Images of Child Pornography 
On April 6, 2007, Howard Cotterman and his wife attempted to enter 
the United States from Mexico at the Lukeville, Arizona Port of Entry 
(“POE”).26 During the U.S. border agents’ initial inspection, the Treasury 
Enforcement Communication System (“TECS”) returned a hit indicating 
that Cotterman was a sex offender.27 Because of this TECS hit, border 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155–56 & n.2 (indicating that some searches of property 
may be so destructive or offensive as to require reasonable suspicion). 
 21 See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DIRECTIVE 3340-049, BORDER SEARCHES OF ELEC-
TRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING INFORMATION 1 (2009); U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS EN-
FORCEMENT, DIRECTIVE 7-6.1, BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 1 (2009). 
 22 See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 21, at 4; U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, at 7–8; Rachel Flipse, Comment, An Unbalanced Standard: Search 
and Seizure of Electronic Data Under the Border Search Doctrine, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 851, 858 
(2010) (discussing the directives’ limitations regarding confiscated data). 
 23 U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 21, at 4. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. In any event, the ICE directive mandates that all information gathered from electronic 
devices be destroyed within twenty-one days of the initial search. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, at 8. 
 26 United States v. Cotterman (Cotterman II), 637 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d 
en banc, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 27 Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 957. TECS is an “information sharing platform” that acts as a 
primary tool for border agents to determine if individuals should be admitted into the country. 
JACQUELINE RUSSELL-TAYLOR, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-009(A), TECS SYS-
TEM: CBP PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PROCESSING (TECS) NATIONAL SAR INITIATIVE 2 (2011). 
The TECS hit indicated that Cotterman had a 1992 conviction for two counts of use of a minor in 
sexual conduct, two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child, and three counts of child 
molestation. Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 957. 
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agents conducted a secondary inspection and recovered two laptop comput-
ers and three digital cameras.28 After discovering inaccessible password-
protected files on one laptop, agents from the ICE office detained the Cot-
termans’ devices for a full forensic examination.29 
Two days later, an ICE agent discovered seventy-five images of child 
pornography on one of the confiscated laptops.30 When a border agent con-
tacted Cotterman, he fled to Mexico, and then continued on to Sydney, Aus-
tralia.31 On June 27, 2007, Cotterman was indicted in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Arizona for production of child pornography, trans-
portation and shipping of child pornography, importation of obscene mate-
rial, and unlawful flight to avoid prosecution.32 After being charged, Aus-
tralian law enforcement arrested Cotterman and extradited him to Arizona.33 
Upon return to Arizona, Cotterman moved to suppress all evidence that 
was recovered from his laptop.34 He argued that reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity was needed before the border agents could search his lap-
top, and that the agents lacked such suspicion.35 Pursuant to a Report and 
Recommendation from a Magistrate Judge, the district court granted the 
motion to suppress in full because the border agents had conducted an ex-
tended border search in the absence of reasonable suspicion.36 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 957. 
 29 Id. at 957–58; see supra note 4 (describing a forensic examination). 
 30 Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 958. 
 31 Id. at 959. Two days after Cotterman fled, an ICE agent accessed Cotterman’s password-
protected files and uncovered an additional 378 images of child pornography. Cotterman II, 637 F.3d 
at 1073. 
 32 Cotterman II, 637 F.3d at 1073. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence & Request for Evidentiary Hearing at 1, United 
States v. Cotterman (Cotterman I), No. CR 07-1207-TUC-RCC (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2009), 2009 WL 
465028, ECF No. 17. 
 35 Id. at 6. 
 36 United States v. Cotterman (Cotterman I), No. CR 07-01207-TUC-RCC, 2009 WL 465028, 
at *9–10 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2009), rev’d en banc, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2009). In his Recommen-
dation, Magistrate Judge Charles Pyle held that the forensic examination was an extended border 
search because it was conducted two days after the initial search at a location approximately 170 
miles away from the Lukeville POE. Report and Recommendation at 13, United States v. Cotter-
man, No. CR 4:07-01207-RCC-CRP (D. Ariz. Sept. 12, 2008), ECF No. 52. Extended border 
searches are an additional category of searches that require reasonable suspicion. United States v. 
Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1366–67 (11th 
Cir. 1982). An extended border search involves a warrantless search conducted away from the 
border or its functional equivalent after the “first point in time when the entity might have been 
stopped within the country.” United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1148 (5th Cir. 1993). Extend-
ed border searches require a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because they involve a 
greater intrusion on privacy interests than searches conducted at the border. See United States v. 
Niver, 689 F.2d 520, 526 (5th Cir. 1982). A substantial number of district court cases, including 
Cotterman I, have treated forensic examinations of laptops away from the border as extended 
border searches. See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, CR 09-00946 JSW, 2010 WL 2231796, at *4 
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On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit—sitting en 
banc—held that the district court erred in granting Cotterman’s motion to 
suppress.37 Previously, a divided panel of the court held in Cotterman II that 
the search was not an extended border search requiring reasonable suspi-
cion.38 When sitting en banc, the Cotterman III court also held that the 
search did not qualify as an extended border search.39 Despite this holding, 
the en banc court also held that reasonable suspicion was still necessary to 
conduct the search—due primarily to the nature of the property being 
searched.40 Unlike the district court, however, the court ruled that there was 
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and thus the evidence was ad-
missible.41 
II. SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICES: A SUSPICIONLESS OR 
REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD? 
While the border search doctrine has existed for hundreds of years, 
electronic storage devices are a more recent invention.42 Today, courts must 
determine to what extent the longstanding border search doctrine can be 
applied to new technologies.43 Section A of this Part discusses the landscape 
of federal court cases analyzing searches of electronic storage devices prior 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2009 decision in United 
States v. Cotterman (Cotterman III).44 Section B of this Part discusses the 
Cotterman III court’s narrowing of these precedents.45 
                                                                                                                           
(N.D. Cal. June 2, 2010); United States v. Stewart, 715 F. Supp. 2d 750, 755 (E.D. Mich. 2010); 
Cotterman I, 2009 WL 465028, at *9. This case law is beyond the scope of this brief Comment 
because the Cotterman III court held that the forensic examination of Cotterman’s laptop was not 
an extended border search. 709 F.3d at 962. 
 37 Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 970. 
 38 Cotterman II, 637 F.3d at 1079, 1083–84 (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not 
require reasonable suspicion for all secondary inspections of property seized at the border). 
 39 Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 962 (“A border search is not transformed into an extended bor-
der search simply because the device is transported and examined beyond the border.”). 
 40 See id. at 964–66, 968 (holding that the unique qualities of laptops require reasonable sus-
picion for forensic examinations). 
 41 Id. at 970. 
 42 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (indicating that the border search 
exception has existed in some form since 1789). 
 43 See YULE KIM & ANNA C. HENNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34404, BORDER 
SEARCHES OF LAPTOP COMPUTERS AND OTHER ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICES 3, 7 (2008) 
(stating that federal courts must decide “whether the border search exception applies to electronic 
storage devices, and if it does, what degree of suspicion is needed to justify a warrantless search”). 
 44 See infra notes 46–59 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 60–72 and accompanying text. 
2014] Cotterman Narrows the Border Search Doctrine for Electronic Devices 37 
A. A Universal Circuit Precedent: Suspicionless Searches of Electronic 
Storage Devices 
Prior to Cotterman III, numerous circuit courts—the Third, Fourth, and 
Ninth circuits—unanimously held that searches of electronic storage devic-
es at the border did not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.46 
According to this precedent, the Cotterman II panel held that electronic 
storage devices could be searched without reasonable suspicion.47 
Courts upholding suspicionless border searches of electronic storage 
devices reason that reasonable suspicion is not required if none of the Flo-
res-Montano exceptions apply.48 In 2008, in United States v. Arnold, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that reasonable suspicion is 
not required to search an electronic storage device at the border.49 The court 
rejected the defendant’s arguments primarily through an application of the 
Flores-Montano exceptions.50 The court reasoned that the search of the lap-
top was not “destructive,” because the defendant never argued that his lap-
top was damaged.51 Further, the court held that simply turning on a laptop 
and looking at files would not qualify as being “particularly offensive.”52 
At least one court has reasoned that national security concerns, logisti-
cal difficulties, and U.S. Supreme Court precedent justify suspicionless 
border searches of electronic storage devices.53 In 2005, in United States v. 
Ickes, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld suspicionless 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Linarez-
Delgado, 259 F. App'x. 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507–08 (4th 
Cir. 2005). 
 47 Cotterman II, 637 F.3d 1068, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 709 F.3d 952 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
 48 See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008–10; United States v. Hernandez, 424 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 
2005); supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions that the U.S. Supreme 
Court established in its 2004 United States v. Flores-Montano decision); see also United States v. 
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152, 155–56 & n.2 (2004). 
 49 Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008. In Arnold, the defendant flew from the Philippines to the Los 
Angeles International Airport with a laptop that contained a collection of child pornography. Id. at 
1005. The Arnold decision was not the first time that the Ninth Circuit refused to require reasona-
ble suspicion for laptop searches. See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(declining to consider if a search of a laptop requires reasonable suspicion). 
 50 Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008–09 (citing Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155–56 & n.2); see supra 
note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the Flores-Montano exceptions). In Arnold, the de-
fendant argued that reasonable suspicion was required because “laptop computers are fundamen-
tally different from traditional closed containers,” and because the First Amendment requires a 
reasonable suspicion requirement for border searches of expressive materials. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 
1006. 
 51 Id. at 1009. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506–07 (citing New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 874 (1986); 
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620). 
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border searches of electronic storage devices.54 In Ickes, the court rejected 
the defendant’s argument that the border search doctrine did not apply to 
“expressive” items that are protected by the First Amendment.55 
 Guided by the Ickes and Arnold rulings, in 2011, in Cotterman II, a 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a reasona-
ble suspicion of criminal activity was not required for U.S. border agents to 
search Cotterman’s laptop.56 The panel applied the Flores-Montano excep-
tions, and focused on whether the forensic examination of the laptop away 
from the border was “particularly offensive.”57 The court held that such 
searches are not necessarily offensive, as some searches of electronic stor-
age devices require “complex equipment and technical personnel” that can-
not be located at the POE.58 Further, a search does not become unreasonable 
solely because it continues for an extended period of time.59 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507–08. There, the defendant attempted to cross the U.S.-Canadian 
border in a van containing a collection of contraband, including a computer with approximately 
seventy-five disks of child pornography. Id. at 502–03. 
 55 Id. at 506. The defendant in Ickes made this argument in an effort to persuade the court that 
his computer and disks were “expressive” and therefore outside of the scope of the border search 
doctrine. Id. The court rejected this argument for three reasons. Id. at 506–07. First, the court indi-
cated that a First Amendment exception to the border search doctrine would impair national secu-
rity by creating a “sanctuary at the border for all expressive material,” which could possibly in-
clude terrorist communications. Id. Second, the court noted that it would be difficult for border 
agents to determine exactly what type of expressive items are covered by the First Amendment 
exception. Id. Third, the court noted that in its 1986 decision New York v. P.J. Video, the U.S. Su-
preme Court was unwilling to create a First Amendment exception for expressive items in the 
context of warrant applications. Id. at 507 (citing P.J. Video, 475 U.S. at 874 (refusing to require a 
heightened standard of probable cause for warrant applications when expressive items are in-
volved); Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620 (stating that it was unnecessary to consider the First Amendment 
in the border search context)). The Arnold court also adhered to the Ickes’ court’s reasoning when 
it refused to create a First Amendment exception to the border search doctrine. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 
1010 (citing Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506–08). 
 56 Cotterman II, 637 F.3d at 1083. 
 57 Id. at 1080. According to Cotterman, the U.S. border agents could have discovered the child 
pornography at the POE if they had conducted a forensic search there or had accepted his offer to 
help them access password-protected files. Id. Therefore, Cotterman argued that the forensic exami-
nation of the laptops away from the border was “particularly offensive” because it could have been 
conducted at the border and also involved an extensive amount of time. Id. The court quickly deter-
mined that the other two Flores-Montano exceptions—highly intrusive searches of the person and 
destructive searches of property—did not apply. Id. 
 58 Id. at 1081–82. 
 59 Id. at 1082 ([W]e have . . . consistently rejected hard-and-fast time limits . . . . [C]ommon 
sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.” (quoting United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542–44 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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B. The Ninth Circuit Establishes a New Requirement of Reasonable 
Suspicion for Forensic Examinations of Electronic Storage Devices 
In Cotterman III, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit—
sitting en banc—narrowed existing federal circuit precedent by reversing 
the decision of the Cotterman II panel and establishing a reasonable suspi-
cion requirement for forensic examinations of electronic storage devices.60 
The court, emphasizing the need to protect “substantial personal privacy 
interests,” held that electronic storage devices should be treated differently 
than traditional storage devices because they have unique characteristics.61 
The court reasoned that these unique characteristics make any search of an 
electronic storage device a “particularly offensive” search, which requires 
reasonable suspicion.62 
The court highlighted three characteristics of electronic storage devic-
es that render searches of such materials “particularly offensive.”63 First, the 
court stressed that these devices have immense storage capacities and con-
tain large amounts of private information.64 Accordingly, electronic storage 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied, 82 U.S.L.W. 
3095 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2014) (No. 13-186). Because the court held that a manual search of electronic 
files would not require reasonable suspicion, Cotterman III does not directly conflict with either 
Ickes or Arnold, both of which also held that manual searches of laptops did not require reasonable 
suspicion. See id. at 967; Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008; Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507–08. A manual search 
requires that border agents access individual files by hand, where a forensic search involves com-
plex technology that copies and searches an electronic storage device’s hard drive. See Cotterman 
III, 709 F.3d at 958 (forensic search); Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1005 (manual search). While the Cot-
terman III court limited its holding to forensic examinations, its analysis focused on how electron-
ic storage devices are different than traditional storage devices, rather than on how forensic 
searches are more intrusive than manual searches. See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 964–66. 
 61 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 964–66. The Cotterman III court treated laptops as a unique 
category of property deserving special protection under the Fourth Amendment; while other courts 
have treated all forms of property equally. Compare Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 966 (stating that 
the constitutional inquiry of reasonableness “must account for differences in property”), with 
United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[t]he format of a record 
or document should not be dispositive to a Fourth Amendment inquiry”), Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009 
(stating that the U.S. Supreme Court has “refused to draw distinctions between [different] contain-
ers of information”), and Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507 (holding that “expressive material” would not be 
treated differently). While courts, until Cotterman III, have avoided treating laptops as a special 
category of property, some in the academic community have been more willing to afford special 
protection to electronic storage devices. See Christine A. Coletta, Note, Laptop Searches at the 
United States Borders and the Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REV. 
971, 999 (2007) (arguing that a “laptop is substantively different from a wallet”). 
 62 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 964–66, 968. It is unclear which of the three Flores-
Montano exceptions the majority opinion relies upon in Cotterman III. See id. at 973 (Callahan, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But, because a laptop is not a person and there 
were no allegations of destruction, it appears that the majority holds that a forensic examination of 
an electronic storage device qualifies as “particularly offensive.” See id. 
 63 Id. at 964–66 (majority opinion); see infra notes 64–72 and accompanying text (discussing 
the three characteristics that make searches of electronic storage devices “particularly offensive”). 
 64 Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 964. 
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devices, in the view of the court, are unlike traditional storage devices due 
to their ability to contain “warehouses of information.”65 
 Second, the court explained that the nature of electronically stored 
content is different from that of traditional storage devices.66 Electronic 
storage devices contain “the most intimate details of our lives.”67 The court 
stated that electronic storage devices are “simultaneously offices and per-
sonal diaries.”68 
 Third, the court observed that it is often difficult to effectively remove 
data from electronic storage devices.69 Electronic storage devices may “re-
tain sensitive and confidential information far beyond the perceived point of 
erasure.”70 For the court, this retention of “deleted” data is significant be-
cause it makes it difficult for an international traveler to withhold any digi-
tal information from inspection.71 Besides the ability to retain “deleted” da-
ta, the court also noted that, for most travelers, removing certain files prior 
to crossing the border is not a practical method of maintaining privacy.72 
III. REASONABLE SUSPICION: A CLUMSY SOLUTION TO A  
COMPLICATED PROBLEM 
 U.S. border agents should be able to conduct forensic examinations of 
electronic storage devices with minimal suspicion.73 A suspicionless search 
standard avoids the creation of arbitrary distinctions between different types 
of property.74 Moreover, suspicionless searching is a clear standard that al-
                                                                                                                           
 65 Id. The court points out that a 400 gigabyte laptop could hold over 200 million pages of paper. 
Id. (citing Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in the Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV 531, 542 
(2005) (explaining that an eighty gigabyte hard drive can hold forty million pages of paper)). 
 66 Id.  
 67 Id. At least one academic author also argues that electronic storage devices should be ex-
cluded from traditional Fourth Amendment doctrines because they are “reasonably likely to con-
tain intimate personal information.” Joshua A. Engel, Doctrinal Collapse: Smart Phones Cause 
Courts to Reconsider Fourth Amendment Searches of Electronic Devices, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 233, 
297 (2010). 
 68 Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 964. 
 69 Id. at 965. 
 70 Id.; see also Ty E. Howard, Don’t Cache Out Your Case: Prosecuting Child Pornography 
Laws Based on Images Located in Temporary Internet Files, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1228 
(2004) (stating that “computer-based evidence is not easily destroyed without specialized 
knowledge”). 
 71 Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 965. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Cotterman II, 637 F.3d 1068, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 709 F.3d 952 
(9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507–08 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 74 See Nathan Alexander Sales, Run for the Border: Laptop Searches and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2009) (“[P]rivacy protections travelers enjoy should not 
depend on whether they store their data in digital format or on paper.”). 
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lows U.S. border agents to detect criminal activity.75 Instead of changing the 
legal standard for searches, the existing CBP and ICE directives should be 
strengthened to limit the sharing and retention of digitally acquired infor-
mation.76 Focusing on how information is used, as opposed to when it can 
be collected, is an administratively practical standard that avoids tampering 
with constitutional doctrine and also strikes an appropriate balance between 
border protection goals and personal privacy interests.77 
 To determine if reasonable suspicion is required, courts should focus 
on the manner in which a border search is conducted, rather than on the in-
herent qualities of the property being searched.78 Because electronic storage 
devices often serve the same functional purposes as traditional storage de-
vices, treating the two categories of property equally is logical.79 Suitcases, 
luggage, and any other traditional storage containers are always subjected to 
suspicionless border searches even if they contain large amounts of personal 
information.80 Merely converting the personal information contained in a 
suitcase into an electronic form should not be enough to bestow heightened 
constitutional protection.81 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has long held 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d 952, 979 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Callahan, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment), cert. denied, 82 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2014) (No. 
13-186) (suggesting that a reasonable suspicion requirement will make it more difficult for U.S. 
border agents to conduct meaningful searches); id. at 982 (Smith, J., dissenting) (stating that rea-
sonable suspicion is “administratively impractical”); Kelly A. Gilmore, Note, Preserving the Bor-
der Search Doctrine in a Digital World, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 759, 781 (2007) (arguing that U.S. 
border agents must be able to conduct suspicionless searches to protect the country from “terror-
ism, narcotics trafficking, illegal money transfers, and child pornographers”). 
 76 See Flipse, supra note 22, at 858–59 (arguing that existing federal regulations have made 
progress but still do not provide travelers with enough protection); Gilmore, supra note 75, at 781 
(arguing for a “new CBP policy providing for the destruction of copied materials”); supra notes 
21–25 and accompanying text (discussing the CBP and ICE directives). 
 77 See Sales, supra note 74, at 1124; Sunil Bector, Note, “Your Laptop, Please:” The Search 
and Seizure of Electronic Devices at the United States Border, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 695, 716–
17 (2009). 
 78 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 988 (Smith, J., dissenting) (indicating that the U.S. Supreme 
Court in its 2004 United States v. Flores-Montano decision did not distinguish between types of 
property); see also United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152, 155–56 & n.2 (2004). 
 79 See Erick Lucadamo, Note, Reading Your Mind at the Border: Searching Memorialized 
Thoughts and Memories on Your Laptop and United States v. Arnold, 54 VILL. L. REV. 541, 570 
(2009) (arguing that laptops are only digital versions of preexisting modes of storage). 
 80 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (stating that an international traveler’s 
luggage may be searched “no matter how great the traveler’s desire to conceal the contents may 
be”); Lucadamo, supra note 79, at 572–73 (explaining that U.S. border agents have always pos-
sessed the authority to conduct suspicionless searches of “large sailing vessels” that may contains 
thousands of items). 
 81 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 987 (Smith, J., dissenting) (stating that affording digitalized 
information added constitutional protection is both artificial and arbitrary); Sales, supra note 74, at 
1115 (arguing that it is illogical to treat identical information differently based on where the in-
formation is stored). 
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that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the characteristics of the prop-
erty being searched are irrelevant.82 
Furthermore, unlike the court’s approach in Cotterman III, treating all 
forms of property the same does not create line-drawing problems.83 For 
example, if all property is treated equally, courts would not need to deter-
mine exactly how many gigabytes a hard drive must have before it qualifies 
for reasonable suspicion protection.84 Using storage capacity, as well as any 
other characteristic, as a criterion for granting reasonable suspicion protec-
tion is simply not feasible.85 
Additionally, a suspicionless border search standard helps U.S. border 
agents to maintain national security and thwart criminal activities.86 Afford-
ing electronic storage devices reasonable suspicion protection would only 
make it more difficult to combat issues such as child pornography and ter-
rorism.87 The government’s interest in preventing harmful contraband from 
entering the country is at its peak at the border.88 Without the ability to con-
duct suspicionless forensic examinations, it will be more difficult for U.S. 
border agents to prevent images of child pornography and terrorist plans 
from entering the country.89 For example, a member of Al-Qaeda could 
store encrypted files of plans to bomb a federal building on his laptop be-
fore crossing the border, knowing that U.S. border agents cannot search any 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977) (“It is clear that there is nothing in 
the rationale behind the border-search exception which suggests that the mode of entry will be 
critical.”). Prior to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2013 ruling in Cotterman III, 
the court had also held that the characteristics of searched property did not affect a Fourth 
Amendment analysis. See United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating 
that “neither the quantity of information, nor the form in which it is stored, is legally relevant in 
the Fourth Amendment context”); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing other 
federal appeals courts that had declined to treat laptops differently than other property). The aca-
demic community sometimes refers to the concept of treating property equally as “technology 
neutrality.” See Sales, supra note 74, at 1114–15; Benjamin Rankin, Note, Restoring Privacy at 
the Border: Extending the Reasonable Suspicion Standard for Laptop Border Searches, 43 COL-
UM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 301, 345 (2011). 
 83 See Sales, supra note 74, at 1113; see also Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 977–78 (Callahan, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that distinguishing between electronic 
storage devices and traditional storage devices is arbitrary). 
 84 See Sales, supra note 74, at 1113 (explaining that it would be impossible for a court to 
determine size requirements for a hard drive to qualify for reasonable suspicion protection). 
 85 See id. (advocating for a uniform rule for both traditional and electronic storage devices). 
 86 See Gilmore, supra note 75, at 781; Lucadamo, supra note 79, at 574. 
 87 See Gilmore, supra note 75, at 781; Lucadamo, supra note 79, at 574. 
 88 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (“The Government’s interest in preventing the entry of 
unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border.”). 
 89 See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 21, at 1; Lucadamo, supra note 79, at 
574; see also Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507 (observing that prohibiting suspicionless searches of expres-
sive material would create a “sanctuary at the border . . . for terrorist plans”). 
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encrypted files without reasonable suspicion.90 The Cotterman III court cre-
ated a legal loophole for technologically-sophisticated criminals.91 
Finally, unlike searches requiring reasonable suspicion, suspicionless 
border searches provide a practical legal standard.92 Every year, U.S. border 
agents conduct millions of border searches.93 These agents do not have the 
time or the resources to determine on a case-by-case basis if there is a rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity.94 Even if a particular POE is not well 
traveled, U.S. border agents are not trained to make complex legal judg-
ments.95 Agents will be hesitant to conduct forensic examinations that could 
result in civil liability if a court later determines that reasonable suspicion 
was absent at the time of the search.96 Suspicionless searches avoid these 
administrative problems because U.S. border agents are not asked to make 
legal conclusions.97 
While electronic storage devices do not deserve heightened constitu-
tional protection for all of the above reasons, the information gathered from 
these devices should be closely governed by agency regulations.98 U.S. bor-
der agents have the ability to copy data from confiscated hard drives to 
government-owned devices.99 This data can then be shared with a variety of 
government agencies or even retained for an indefinite period of time with-
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 985 (Smith, J., dissenting). There is abundant evidence that 
terrorists use electronic storage devices to plan and carry out attacks. Gilmore, supra note 75, at 
777–78 (discussing several notable examples of terrorists using electronic storage devices). 
 91 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 985 (Smith, J., dissenting); Gilmore supra note 75, at 786. 
 92 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 979 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 982 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 93 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. PRIVACY OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 54 (2009). 
 94 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (explaining that reasonable 
suspicion for every vehicle search at the U.S.-Mexican border would be impossible due to the 
large volume of travelers). 
 95 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 984 (Smith, J., dissenting) (reasoning that requiring complex 
legal judgments “strips agents of their necessary discretion and deprives them of an administrable 
rule”); Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1010 (citing Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506) (forcing border agents to decide 
“on their feet” if property is “expressive” would be an unworkable legal standard). 
 96 See Cotterman III, 709 F.3d at 979 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (observing that U.S. border agents may avoid conducting forensic examinations of 
electronic storage devices rather than risk making an incorrect legal judgment). 
 97 See id. at 984 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 98 See Sales, supra note 74, at 1133–34 (arguing that congressional or executive reform is 
preferable to the Fourth Amendment); Bector, supra note 77, at 696 (arguing that Congress should 
direct the DHS to enact regulations to govern the searches of electronic devices at the border). 
 99 See Nicole Kolinski, Note, United States v. Arnold: Legally Correct but Logistically Im-
practical, 6 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 31, 51 (2009). 
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out ever alerting travelers.100 Accordingly, agency regulations should be 
implemented to prevent the misuse of this sensitive information.101 
 Despite the accomplishments of the existing CBP and ICE directives, 
more can be done to limit how border agents use digitally-acquired infor-
mation.102 Currently, information obtained from an electronic storage device 
can be shared with any number of government agencies that are assisting 
the search.103 This is problematic because the existing regulations place no 
deadlines on when these assisting government agencies must destroy con-
fiscated data.104 Moreover, even if information is not shared with other 
agencies, travelers are not notified when CBP or ICE destroys copied in-
formation.105 Perhaps the greatest problem with the directives, however, is 
that they fail to grant travelers any rights or benefits.106 In other words, 
travelers cannot sue CBP or ICE for violating their respective directives.107  
Rather than adding a reasonable suspicion requirement for forensic ex-
aminations of electronic storage devices, the issues associated with such 
searches should be addressed in restructured CBP and ICE directives.108 
The directives should provide explicit legally binding limitations regarding 
the use of electronically acquired information.109 For example, the direc-
                                                                                                                           
 100 Bret E. Rasner, Student Article, International Travelers Beware: No Reasonable Suspicion 
Needed to Search Your Electronic Storage Devices at the Border, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 669, 677–78 
(2010). 
 101 Sales, supra note 74, at 1094 (stating that legislators may want to supplement the relative-
ly weak Fourth Amendment protection granted to electronic storage devices). 
 102 See Flipse, supra note 22, at 858–59 (discussing the limitations of the current ICE and 
CBP directives); Kolinski, supra note 99, at 48 (arguing that the existing directives on information 
retention are vague and afford agents “excessive discretion in dealing with . . . privileged infor-
mation”); supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text (discussing the CBP and ICE directives). 
 103 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, at 2; Flipse, supra note 22, 
at 858. 
 104 See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 21, at 9 (stating that assisting federal 
agencies “should” destroy any copies of confiscated information); U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, at 10 (stating that assisting federal agencies must certify to the ICE 
when copies of confiscated information are destroyed); Flipse, supra note 22, at 859 (discussing 
the limitations of the current directives). 
 105 Flipse, supra note 22, at 859. 
 106 U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 21, at 9; U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, at 10; see Flipse, supra note 22, at 859 (“A disclaimer that the 
directives do not create any rights or guarantees that could be invoked by an individual tempers 
what limited assurance the policies may actually provide to the travelers.”). 
 107 See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 21, at 9; U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, at 10. 
 108 See Flipse, supra note 22, at 874 (arguing for strict agency guidelines for notifying travel-
ers when confiscated information has been copied and when it is eventually destroyed); Gilmore, 
supra note 75, at 781 (advocating for a new CBP policy mandating the timely destruction of in-
formation copied during forensic examinations). 
 109 See Sales, supra note 74, at 1124 (emphasizing “‘use limits,’ which restrict the govern-
ment’s ability to share or otherwise use the information it does gather” over “‘collection limits,’ 
which restrict the government’s ability to gather information in the first place”). 
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tives could be amended to require that all data shared with other govern-
ment agencies must be destroyed within a certain period of time.110 Fur-
thermore, to make the directives enforceable, travelers should be granted 
the right to sue the CBP or ICE for directive violations.111 Restricting the 
CBP and ICE’s use of confiscated data would aid national security efforts, 
by leaving the border search doctrine intact, while simultaneously safe-
guarding individual privacy interests.112 Moreover, unlike the reasonable 
suspicion standard, restructured directives would be administratively practi-
cal because border agents would not have to make complex legal judgments 
at busy POEs.113 
CONCLUSION 
Rapid advances in technology have resulted in new personal privacy 
implications. While these questions of personal privacy must be addressed, 
the border search doctrine, which has remained largely intact for over two 
hundred years, should not be sacrificed. In United States v. Cotterman (Cot-
terman III), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit—sitting en 
banc—improperly carved out a piece of the border search doctrine by estab-
lishing an impractical reasonable suspicion requirement for forensic exami-
nations of electronic storage devices. This new requirement will make it 
more difficult for U.S. border agents to combat terrorism and child pornog-
raphy. This Comment has argued, alternatively, that restricting the scope of 
forensic examinations through restructured CBP and ICE directives is a 
more appropriate vehicle for protecting personal privacy interests while still 
addressing the looming national security concerns that such border searches 
entail. 
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 110 See Flipse, supra note 22, at 859. 
 111 Contra U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., supra note 22, at 9 (stating that the directive is 
an internal policy statement that does not give travelers any rights); U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUS-
TOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 22, at 10 (same). 
 112 See Bector, supra note 77, at 716–17 (arguing that new legislation can “compromise be-
tween the strong governmental interest in protecting the borders and the privacy interests retained 
by individuals”). 
 113 See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1010 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506) (indicating that 
forcing border agents to make legal judgments during searches is an “unworkable standard”). 
  
 
